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We propose SenseHash, a novel design for the lightweight in-hardware mystification of the sensed data at the origin. The framework aims to ensure the privacy of sensitive sensor values while preserving their utility. The sensors are assumed to interface to various (potentially malicious) communication and computing components in the Internet-of-things (IoT) and other emerging pervasive computing scenarios. The primary security primitives of our work are Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH) combined with Differential Privacy (DP) and secure construction of LSH. Our construction allows (i) sub-linear search in sensor readings while ensuring their security against triangulation attack, and (ii) differentially private statistics of the readings. SenseHash includes hardware architecture as well as accompanying protocols to efficiently utilize the secure readings in practical scenarios. Alongside these scenarios, we present an automated workflow to generalize the application of the mystified readings. Proof-of-concept FPGA implementation of the system demonstrates its practicability and low overhead in terms of hardware resources, energy consumption, and protocol execution time. 

In this paper, we investigate the security and privacy of the three critical procedures of the 4G LTE protocol (i.e., attach, detach, and paging), and in the process, uncover potential design flaws of the protocol and unsafe practices employed by the stakeholders. For exposing vulnerabilities, we propose a modelbased testing approach LTEInspector which lazily combines a symbolic model checker and a cryptographic protocol verifier in the symbolic attacker model. Using LTEInspector, we have uncovered 10 new attacks along with 9 prior attacks, categorized into three abstract classes (i.e., security, user privacy, and disruption of service), in the three procedures of 4G LTE. Notable among our findings is the authentication relay attack that enables an adversary to spoof the location of a legitimate user to the core network without possessing appropriate credentials. To ensure that the exposed attacks pose real threats and are indeed realizable in practice, we have validated 8 of the 10 new attacks and their accompanying adversarial assumptions through experimentation in a real testbed. 

In this paper, we investigate the security and privacy of the three critical procedures of the 4G LTE protocol (i.e., attach, detach, and paging), and in the process, uncover potential design flaws of the protocol and unsafe practices employed by the stakeholders. For exposing vulnerabilities, we propose a model-based testing approach LTEInspector which lazily combines a symbolic model checker and a cryptographic protocol verifier in the symbolic attacker model. Using LTEInspector, we have uncovered 10 new attacks along with 9 prior attacks, categorized into three abstract classes (i.e., security, user privacy, and disruption of service), in the three procedures of 4G LTE. Notable among our findings is the authentication relay attack that enables an adversary to spoof the location of a legitimate user to the core network without possessing appropriate credentials. To ensure that the exposed attacks pose real threats and are indeed realizable in practice, we have validated 8 of the 10 new attacks and their accompanying adversarial assumptions through experimentation in a real testbed. 

Long noncoding RNAs (lncRNAs) are often associated with polysomes, indicating coding potential. However, only a handful of endogenous proteins encoded by putative lncRNAs have been identified and assigned a function. Here, we report the discovery of a putative gastrointestinal-tract-specific lncRNA ( LINC00675 ) that is regulated by the pioneer transcription factor FOXA1 and encodes a conserved small protein of 79 amino acids which we termed FORCP ( FO XA1- R egulated C onserved Small P rotein). FORCP transcript is undetectable in most cell types but is abundant in well-differentiated colorectal cancer (CRC) cells where it functions to inhibit proliferation, clonogenicity, and tumorigenesis. The epitope-tagged and endogenous FORCP protein predominantly localizes to the endoplasmic reticulum (ER). In response to ER stress, FORCP depletion results in decreased apoptosis. Our findings on the initial characterization of FORCP demonstrate that FORCP is a novel, conserved small protein encoded by a mis-annotated lncRNA that regulates apoptosis and tumorigenicity in well-differentiated CRC cells. 

Abstract The multiplicity dependence of the pseudorapidity density of charged particles in proton–proton (pp) collisions at centre-of-mass energies $$\sqrt{s}~=~5.02$$ s = 5.02 , 7 and 13 TeV measured by ALICE is reported. The analysis relies on track segments measured in the midrapidity range ( $$|\eta | < 1.5$$ | η | < 1.5 ). Results are presented for inelastic events having at least one charged particle produced in the pseudorapidity interval $$|\eta |<1$$ | η | < 1 . The multiplicity dependence of the pseudorapidity density of charged particles is measured with mid- and forward rapidity multiplicity estimators, the latter being less affected by autocorrelations. A detailed comparison with predictions from the PYTHIA 8 and EPOS LHC event generators is also presented. The results can be used to constrain models for particle production as a function of multiplicity in pp collisions.